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SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: A COMMENT ON
THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASPECT OF
BROWNFIELDS PROGRAMS
Georgette C. Poindexter*
Several states and the federal government have proposed and
enacted what are termed "Brownfields Programs." These initia-
tives have two goals: 1) creation of employment in economically
distressed areas surrounded by urban "brownfields" (contami-
nated properties); and 2) preservation of "greenfields" (pristine
land) from development.
This Article discusses the efficacy of the urban development as-
pect of these initiatives. Specifically it argues that while cities (no-
tably those in the northeast and northcentral United States) may
have suffered the impact of deindustrialization disproportionately
to their respective suburbs, these programs create a duality of en-
vironmental protection that will consign the cities to permanent
second class environmental status. These programs provide a
short term fix for a long term problem. This Article proposes that
what is needed is a reexamination of environmental standards as
they apply to both city and suburbs.
Imagine a woman. She is not healthy; in fact, she has cancer.
This particular type of cancer can be cured by Drug #1. Unfortu-
nately, Drug #1 is beyond the economic means of our patient. If
left unchecked, the cancer surely will kill her.
Onto the market comes Drug #2. This new drug will alleviate
many of the symptoms of the woman's cancer, and may even pro-
long her life. Drug #2 will not, however, cure the cancer. Further-
more, Drug #2 is cross-resistant to Drug #1. That is, if a cancer
patient takes Drug #2, Drug #1 (which would have cured the can-
cer) will be rendered permanently ineffective.
Let us consider the plight of our patient. She is certainly going
to die from cancer unless she can find a way to afford Drug #1. In
the meantime, if she chooses to alleviate her symptoms by taking
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Drug #2, she will foreclose the possibility of ever being cured with
Drug #1. The cancer patient is therefore faced with a choice, to
pursue the immediately attainable but fatally limited goal of allevi-
ating her symptoms, or to continue to suffer the symptoms in the
hopes that she will be able to afford the cure before she dies.
Like our hypothetical patient, many of our nation's cities are fac-
ing a choice between taking intermediate steps to fight the symp-
toms that plague them, and taking a longer range view, in hopes of
curing the "cancer" that threatens their existence. The symptoms
crippling America's cities include illegal drugs, homelessness and
crime. The "cancer" at the root of these symptoms is the economic
desolation of the cities' burgeoning underclass. Treating the symp-
toms will not cure the underlying illness. The only cure for the
cities' illness is the eradication of this economic desolation through
urban development. The bedrock of urban development is eco-
nomic development.'
The federal government,2 and several state governments3 have
sought to spur such urban development through programs
designed to make economic activity in urban centers more attrac-
tive to developers. At the center of these programs is the reduc-
tion of environmental standards in urban centers. These changes
are aimed at reducing the economic burdens4 facing developers
1. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1995, at 55, 56-57 ("The real need-and the real oppor-
tunity-is to create wealth .... We must stop trying to cure the problems of the inner
city by perpetually increasing social investment and hoping for economic activity to
follow."); Phillip L. Clay, Choosing Urban Futures: The Transformation of American
Cities, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 28, 32 (1989) ("biggest challenge [to urban transfor-
mation is] bringing the underclass into the mainstream").
2. See generally Announcement of Competition for Final Five Brownfield Eco-
nomic Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,012 (1994) (EPA is providing
funding for fifty Brownfields Pilots throughout the United States in 1995-1996).
3. The states with programs currently in place include Arkansas (ARK. CODE
ANN. § 8-7-520 (Michie 1995)), Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/22.2b)
(Smith-Hurd 1995)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-18 (Bums 1995)), Massa-
chusetts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 21E § 4 (West 1995)), Michigan (MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 299.614 (West 1995)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West
1995)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746 (Anderson 1995)), Pennsylvania (1995
Pa. Laws 2), and Texas (1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 986).
4. For example, the federal government offers buyers of contaminated properties
"Covenants Not to Sue" after cleanup. STEVEN A. HERMAN, UNITED STATES ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON AGREEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE
PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1995). Also, some states have formal-
ized flexible cleanup standards tailored to proposed land use (as opposed to prophy-
lactic application of standards). See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9 (Bums Supp.
1995); the Michigan Environmental Response Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.32(1) (Cal-
laghan 1993).
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who seek to build-up abandoned urban properties that are environ-
mentally contaminated-"brownfields"-and therefore unusable
under current environmental standards.5 It is believed that by
making these properties available for development, through easing
regulatory burdens, new employment opportunities will be created
in the economically disadvantaged areas surrounding the
brownfields sites.
The Brownfields .Programs are not, however, restricted to the
goal of encouraging urban redevelopment. Because the easing of
environmental restrictions will permit developers to use
brownfields for their undertakings, the need to seek out less con-
taminated, and therefore less costly, alternative properties will be
reduced. Thus, the Brownfields Programs also will promote the
preservation of presently undeveloped greenfields. It can there-
fore be said that in addition to constituting economic policy initia-
tives, the Brownfields Programs are also environmental policy
initiatives.6
The job creation strategy of the Brownfields Programs is pre-
mised upon reuse of abandoned industrial sites located in economi-
cally disadvantaged areas. 7 Both implicit 8 and explicit 9 language
5. Such properties are referred to as "brownfields." In contrast, pristine, uncon-
taminated lands are referred to as "greenfields." Throughout this article, these terms
will be employed. The governmental programs aimed at promoting the reuse of
brownfields through the easing of environmental regulations will be referred to as
"Brownfields Programs."
6. While environmental preservationists applaud the saving of undeveloped
greenfields, some question the true motives behind the Brownfields Programs. Em-
ploying the classic "slippery slope" argument, preservationists fear that once the door
to relaxed environmental standards is opened it will never fully close. See Judith Ev-
ans, Cleaning Up The Nation's 'Brownfields', WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1995, at E01.
7. For example, the EPA's pilot program for the city of Birmingham, AL states
that "many of the distressed neighborhoods within and surrounding the City's
brownfields are socio-economically depressed." Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Quick Reference Fact
Sheet: Brownflield Pilot - Birmingham, AL (July 1995) (on file with the author). See
also The Arkansas Program (1995 Ark. Acts 125).
8. For example, two EPA pilot programs have implicit requirements that pro-
grams concentrate in urban areas. The program in Louisville, KY plans to "address a
brownfields site in Louisville's heavy industrial corridor." Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Quick Reference Fact
Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Louisville, KY (July 1995) (on file with the author). The
Rochester, NY pilot program states that "the ultimate objective of Rochester's
Brownfields effort is to eliminate the current bias against urban brownfields." Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Rochester, NY (July 1995) (on file
with the author).
9. Some of the EPA pilot programs do have specific requirements that the pro-
grams focus in urban areas. The goal of the Baltimore, MD pilot program is stated as
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sets out the requirement that the programs concentrate in urban
areas. Such stipulations will create a duality in environmental stan-
dards between cities and suburbs. Once environmental standards
are altered in the city, they will forever remain lower than subur-
ban standards (absent a cataclysmic shift of political will). While
the initial job creation promoted by the Brownfields Programs may
provide some relief from the city's symptoms, the newly created
environmental disparity between the cities and the suburbs will ul-
timately ensure that the cities' illness will continue to flourish. As
land uses, unable to overcome the higher suburban environmental
standards, gravitate to the regulatorily friendly cities, these areas
will ultimately become a haven for the least desirable economic
activity, thereby ensuring their continued desolation. The city,
therefore, like our cancer patient, has been offered a new drug to
alleviate its symptoms. By accepting this new drug, however, the
city eliminates the possibility of a cure.
Some scholarly legal analyses of the Brownfields Programs con-
cede the economic basis of the initiatives and concentrate on the
environmental aspects. 10 Others neglect to discuss the environ-
mental questions while analyzing the economic dimension.11 What
"encouraging economic growth and redevelopment in urban areas." Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Quick Ref-
erence Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Baltimore, MD (July 1995) (on file with the
author). Similarly, the Bridgeport, CT program states that "the ultimate objectives of
Bridgeport's pilot are to return contaminated inner city derelict land to productive
use." Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Bridgeport, CT (July
1995) (on file with the author). The St. Louis, MO program seeks "to develop a solu-
tion to reverse the years of disinvestment and under-utilization that currently plague
the city." Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - St. Louis, MO (July
1995) (on file with the author). Additionally, one state-run program specifically states
that it is for primarily urban areas. The Michigan Site Reclamation Program targets
its program at "underutilized urban properties with economic development poten-
tial." Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Detroit, MI (July 1995)
(on file with the author).
10. James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs:
Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43 (1994); Terry J. Tondro,
Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Ac-
quiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789 (1995); Jane F.
Clokey, Wisconsin's Land Recycling Act: From Brownfield to Greenfield, 2 Wis.
ENVrL. L.J. 35 (1995); James W. Creenan & John Q. Lewis, Pennsylvania's Land Re-
cycling Program: Solving the Brownfields Problem with Remediation Standards and
Limited Liability, 34 Duo. L. REV. 661 (1996).
11. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757 (1993); Staughton Lynd, Towards a Not-
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is missing from the discussion, however, is an acknowledgment that
unless the two prongs (economic and environmental) stand to-
gether, the initiative as a whole must be reconsidered.
This Article challenges the duality implicit in the goals of the
Brownfields Programs. The Article concludes that the potential in-
consistency in environmental standards created by Brownfields
Programs will result in long term environmental apartheid. I chal-
lenge this conflicting environmental treatment not on an environ-
mental basis, but on an economic basis. Cities and suburbs are
economic complements, not substitutes.' 1 Cities hit hardest by
deindustrialization 13 have suburbs also shaken by this process.
Proponents of the Brownfields Programs may point to evidence
that even if cities and suburbs are complements, central cities do
not recover from deindustrialization in the same manner as their
suburbs. 14 Cities face unemployment and poverty concerns gener-
ally not found in the suburbs. The economic benefits of the
Brownfields Programs may address such concerns. The discussion
of these programs, however, should not end there. Brownfields
Programs may alleviate the symptoms of limited economic oppor-
tunity, but they do not cure the cancer itself. In fact, these pro-
grams may prevent the cure by relegating cities to a second-class
environmental status. As second-class environmental concerns, the
cities will be unable to attract the most desirable economic uses,
and will be forced to settle for those uses which can find no place in
the environmentally protected suburbs. If cities choose to accept
disparate environmental treatment, however, I maintain that any
discussion of these programs must acknowledge that environmen-
tal goals will be traded for economic development. Such discussion
will crystallize the long- and short-range advantages and disadvan-
tages of the Brownfields Programs.
Part I briefly describes the various state and federal Brownfields
Programs, with emphasis on the environmental and economic goals
of the programs. Part II introduces quantitative data showing that
while both cities and suburbs in the northeast and northcentral
parts of the United States have suffered as a result of deindustrial-
for-profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Indus-
trial Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13 (1987).
12. See Richard Voith, City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements?,
Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)
(describing the positive correlation between declining cities and slowly growing
suburbs).
13. Namely the cities in the northeast and northcentral United States.
14. See infra part II.A.2.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
ization, these cities and suburbs differ in their ability to absorb
manufacturing job loss into other employment sectors. Part III
synthesizes the previous sections, applying the empirical data to
the economic goals of the Brownfields Programs to determine the
legitimacy of these initiatives as they respond to the impact of
deindustrialization. Part III also explores the long-term environ-
mental and economic impact of the programs.
I. Program Descriptions
Because one of the goals of the Brownfields Programs is to pro-
tect clean land from development by reusing land that is already
contaminated, it differs little from traditional environmental pro-
tectionist policy that favors the preservation of pristine land.15
Brownfields Programs, however, have an additional goal. They
seek to promote economic development by specifying that the
brownfields be reused in such a way as to generate employment for
the area surrounding the contaminated site. For this reason,
Brownfields Programs stipulate that the land being redeveloped
may not be used for residential or recreational purposes.
A. Environmental Goals of Brownfields Programs,
Requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") 16 and state
environmental laws have created demand for previously unused
greenfields. The regulatory structure has created several incentives
which have spurred this demand. First, there are cost considera-
tions. Cost of remediation is a function of the level of clean-up
required by the regulations before the contaminated land may be
reused. Whatever the level required by the regulations, the worse
the land is to start, the more it will cost to bring it up to regulatory
standards. 17
15. In the 1970s, with the environmental movement in full swing, there was an
"epic legislative battle between environmentalists, who wanted to preserve as much as
possible of our last wild and primitive state in a pristine condition, and those who
wanted to exploit the land and resources for economic purposes." PHILIP
SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
132 (1993).
16. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et.
seq. (1994)).
17. It has been noted that the degree of clean and the remediation methods re-
quired under CERCLA are vague and unscientific, and enacted more out of public
panic than scientific proof. See Casey S. Padgett, Selecting Remedies at Superfund
Sites: How Should "Clean" Be Determined?, 18 VT. L. REV. 361 (1994). However,
cost-effectiveness has been one of the criteria with which remedy selection is weighed
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Second, CERCLA imposes strict joint and several liability for
property not meeting its standards. 8 Liability for clean-up costs is
not apportioned according to harm done, but is imposed as a con-
sequence of property ownership. The result is that the value of
contaminated properties, such as brownfields, is driven down by
the potential environmental liability. Where the potential liability
drives the true value of the property below its asking price, it be-
comes unsalable. 19
In light of the above, it is not surprising that developers, rather
than incur the costs of bringing a brownfield up to regulatory stan-
dards, seek land that is free from any possible contamination. The
result is the gobbling up of greenfields while brownfields lie vacant.
Brownfields Programs speak directly to these problems. Cost is
directly addressed by exploring alternative remediation strategies.
Liability is diminished with Covenants Not to Sue. Brownfields
Programs seek to reverse the trend toward development of clean
land by offering limitations on clean-up costs and potential liability
for reuse of existing infrastructure. By giving up, to various de-
grees, strict environmental remediation of previously contaminated
sites, the need to seek out greenfields for development is obviated,
and clean land is therefore preserved.
Land preservation is in keeping with the historical goals of envi-
ronmentalists. In the nineteenth century, Henry David Thoreau
and John Muir both addressed the issue of the "human species as
part of the larger community of life and the importance of a mutu-
ally enhancing bond between man and nature."20 From these early
writings, concern for the environment has grown to a movement
encompassing the protection and preservation of public land and
its natural wildlife. In 1970, President Nixon signed the National
since Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(I)(B) pro-
vides that in addition to cost-effectiveness, the other four criteria are: long-term effec-
tiveness and permanence; reduction of toxicity; mobility or volume through
treatment; short-term effectiveness; and implementability. See Keith Schneider, New
View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993 at Al.
18. CERCLA § 107(a) (42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
19. CERCLA driven liability uncertainty is not the only factor in development
decisions. Information asymmetries also have an effect on property development.
See James Boyd et al., The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate
Development, 12 J. REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 37, 53 (Jan. 1996) (advocating indem-
nity contracts to correct information asymmetries).
20. Joanna Underwood, Groping Our Way Toward an Environmental Ethic, in
VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 55 (Donald Snow ed., 1992).
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Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),2 1 the first in a string of envi-
ronmental legislation directed at preserving natural resources and
land. Today, the focus of the environmental movement rests on the
concept of "respecting natural resources and species other than our
own and according them the same rights to be protected and sus-
tained as those accorded to our species. ' 22 By promoting the pres-
ervation of greenfields through the reuse of contaminated
properties, the Brownfields Programs fit squarely within traditional
environmental thinking.
B. Economic Goals of Brownfields Programs
As the problems of urban America have worsened because of
the poverty of those living in the nation's cities,23 policymakers
have searched for programs linking economic development with
the creation of employment opportunities. By relying on the reuse
of abandoned industrial sites, 24 the Brownfields Programs ap-
proach implicitly the issue of poverty by addressing the employ-
ment vacuum caused by deindustrialization.
The U.S. economy, once driven by manufacturing, is now driven
by the service sector. This "deindustrialization" is a "widespread,
systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic industrial capacity. 25
21. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-
4347).
22. Underwood, supra note 20, at 55.
23. In 1991, 36 million people (14.7% of the total United States population) lived
in poverty. 42% of the poor people lived in America's "center" cities. The Economic
Crisis of Urban America, Bus. WK., May 18, 1992, at 38. The "essence of the [city's]
trouble is not race but.., poverty." America's Cities: Doomed to Burn?, ECONOMIST,
May 9, 1992, at 21; see also JANET PACK, POVERTY AND URBAN PUBLIC EXPENDI-
TURES (Wharton Real Estate Center Working Paper No. 215) ("Cities in the United
States bear a disproportionate responsibility for the public expenditures that grow out
of poverty because they contain disproportionate numbers of the poor ....").
24. In approving the Brownfields Pilot Program for the City of St. Louis, MO, the
EPA stated: "Over the past 45 years, the City of St. Louis has lost half of its jobs and
two thirds of its population to areas outside St. Louis. This has resulted in urban
decay . . . ." Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - St. Louis, MO
(July 1995) (on file with the author). Also, the EPA pilot program for the city of
Baltimore, MD addresses the fact that "old industrial sites in Baltimore have been
abandoned, causing Baltimore to lose over 50% of its manufacturing jobs between
1970 and 1990." Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Quick Reference Fact Sheet: Brownfields Pilot - Baltimore, MD
(July 1995) (on file with the author).
25. Barry Bluestone, Is Deindustrialization a Myth? Capital Mobility Versus Ab-
sorptive Capacity in the U.S. Economy, ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept.
1984, at 40.
BROWNFIELDS INITIATIVES
In 1950, 25.5% of U.S. workers were employed in the manufactur-
ing sector.26 By 1990, this number had dropped to 17.4%.27
Deindustrialization is an expected process of the post-industrial
thesis. 28  This thesis posits that, as an economy matures and
evolves, there will be a drop in the sectoral share of manufacturing
combined with an increase in services and high-tech activities.29
The shift away from dependence on the manufacturing sector is a
restructuring of the economy towards new sectors outside of
manufacturing.3 °
The Brownfields Programs attempt to provide an antidote to the
bitter pill of deindustrialization by reusing the existing, vacant in-
frastructure through "reindustrialization." Economic life can be
pumped into a dying neighborhood by lifting regulatory barriers
that prevent productive use of abandoned property. 31 By concen-
trating on areas of economic stress that surround abandoned indus-
trial sites, the programs seek to ameliorate the effect of
deindustrialization by reusing the site to replace lost jobs.
When the impact of deindustrialization is analyzed and the data
broken down, it is possible to see how individual regions of the
United States have fared in relation to others. 2 It is clear from this
analysis that the effects of deindustrialization are felt dispropor-
26. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1950 Census of the Population, General Social and
Economic Characteristics.
27. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of the Population, General Social and
Economic Characteristics.
28. Lloyd Rodwin, Deindustrialization and Regional Economic Transformation, in
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: THE EXPERI-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (Lloyd Rodwin & Hidehiko Sazanami eds., 1989).
See DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SO-
CIAL FORECASTING 127 (1976).
29. Rodwin, supra note 28, at 12.
30. Glenn Yago et al., Investment and Disinvestment in New York 1960-80, AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI., Sept. 1984, at 29-30.
31. A policy of deliberate industrialization follows from the traditional view that
industrialization promotes growth through linkages. See M.I. Ansari, Growth Effects
of Recent Structural Changes in the Canadian Economy: Some Empirical Evidence, 24
APPLIED ECON. 1233, 1234 (1992) (citing KALDOR, CAUSES OF THE SLOW RATE OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (1966) and KALDOR, STRATEGIC
FACTORS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1967)).
32. Gerald A. Carlino, What Can Output Measures Tell Us About Deindustrializa-
tion in the Nation and its Regions, Bus. REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia),
Jan./Feb. 1989, at 17. See also Ann R. Markusen & Virginia Carlson, Deindustrializa-
tion in the American Midwest: Causes and Responses, in DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND
REGIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
33 (Lloyd Rodwin & Hidehiko Sazanami eds., 1989); Bluestone, supra note 25, at 40.
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tionately in the former industrial core of the United States.33 Of
the fifteen states experiencing deindustrialization both in terms of
output and employment between 1967 and 1986, ten were in the
industrial core. 31 While the nation suffered a decline of more than
10% in manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1986, the midwestern
rate was double that.35 Furthermore, on a regional level there is
evidence that manufacturing job loss correlates with urban pov-
erty.36 In other words, the more manufacturing jobs a region has
lost, the more likely that region now suffers from urban poverty.
Another arm of research concentrates on the impact of deindus-
trialization on central cities. This research is undertaken either as
analysis of a specific city37 or a generalized view of all U.S. cities
taken as a whole.38 Whether specific or general, research consist-
ently shows that urban deindustrialization is a factor contributing
to social and economic isolation of the urban poor.39
The missing research link, insofar as the Brownfields Programs
are concerned, is a comparison of the impact of deindustrialization
on the central city with the impact of deindustrialization on their
respective suburbs. In other words, is the cancer of the city (eco-
nomic desolation) linked to deindustrialization in a way which it is
not in the suburbs?
II. Data Analysis - Linking Deindustrialization to the Goals of
the Brownfields Programs
The effectiveness of the Brownfields Programs in achieving their
economic goals hangs on two distinct, though obviously connected,
questions. The first is whether deindustrialization has affected cit-
ies differently from suburbs. The second question arises because,
33. The industrial core includes the states in the northeast and midwest that have
historically tended to specialize in the production of manufactured goods. Carlino,
supra note 32, at 19.
34. These states are New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. Carlino, supra note 32, at 19-20.
35. Markusen & Carlson, supra note 32, at 33.
36. See Mark A. Hughes, Employment Decentralization and Accessibility: A Strat-
egy for Stimulating Regional Mobility, 57 J. OF AM. PLAN. Assoc. 288, 291 (1991)
(manufacturing deconcentration in the northeast and midwest was the most important
variable in predicting urban poverty concentration between 1970 and 1980).
37. E.g., Yago, supra note 30 (New York); Hughes, supra note 36 (Newark, New
Jersey).
38. E.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Robert Leekley and Michael
Seeborg, Income and Poverty Across SMSAs: A Two Stage Analysis, 19 EASTERN
ECON. J. 43 (1993).
39. WILSON, supra note 38, at 12.
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even if job loss occurs, the ability of other employment sectors to
pick up such loss is clearly connected to the economic health of the
city. So, for a complete picture of the impact of deindustrialization
on central cities we must ask where those who lost their urban
manufacturing jobs went (e.g., to other employment sectors, to un-
employment. or out of the city).40
A. Deindustrialization in the Northeast and Northcentral
United States
Cities, especially those in the northeast and northcentral regions,
traditionally have been the manufacturing anchors of the United
States. Of the fifty largest cities in the United States in 1950, those
in the northeast or northcentral regions41 had a greater percentage
of their employed population working in manufacturing than did
the nation as a whole.4 2
It follows, then, that the effects of deindustrialization have been
more pronounced in these regions of high manufacturing concen-
tration. Because the Brownfields Programs focus on areas affected
by deindustrialization, the urban centers of the northeast and
northcentral regions are hence ripe for the application of these ini-
tiatives. For this reason, the following analysis centers on the cities
in these regions. 3
Statistics demonstrate that, like the rest of the nation, the cities
of the northeast and northcentral regions have suffered a steep de-
cline in manufacturing employment in recent years." What is not
evident from the raw numbers, however, is what part of this decline
is a function of national deindustrialization and what part is due to
endogenous factors associated with the cities? In other words, why
40. Although it may be swimming against the tide, I believe that empirical re-
search has an important place in legal scholarship. Such research allows us to fill in
the gap between abstract policy goals and factual problems. "Empirical scholarship is
a window on the pathologies of the law and allows us to gauge the effect . . . of
particular legal mechanisms .... ." Craig A. Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Rees-
tablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
347, 349 (1995).
41. With the exception of Boston (23.7%) and Minneapolis (24.3%), which were
slightly below the national proportion.
42. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1950 Census of the Population, General Social and
Economic Characteristics.
43. Namely Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Baltimore, New York, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, Boston, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Kansas City (Missouri),
Indianapolis, Newark, Buffalo, Minneapolis.
44. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of the Population, General Social and
Economic Characteristics.
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did these cities suffer disproportionately as compared with the rest
of the nation?
1. Urban Decrease in Manufacturing vs. National Decrease in
Manufacturing
To examine the relationship between the decrease in manufac-
turing in the cities of the northeast and northcentral regions as
compared with that of the rest of the nation, "shift-share" analysis
has been employed.15 Shift-share analysis is a method by which
changes in local employment in an industry are isolated from na-
tional changes in order to facilitate identification of the compo-
nents of the change in that locality.46 "Positive Shift" denotes the
comparative advantage of a locality for that industry. "Negative
Shift" denotes the comparative disadvantage of a locality for that
industry. While shift-share analysis is often used as a predictive
model for employment,4 7 it is used in this article as a descriptive
model.
The mathematical model developed to calculate shift-share in
this article is:
CSI4 = io . (g, -0)
where
i° - the employment share of Sector i in the labor force of the
city at year 0;
-g' the growth index of the employment share of Sector i in
the labor force of the city between year 0 and t;
g ' - the growth index of the employment share of Sector i in
the labor force of the nation between year 0 and t.
As shown in Table 1, cities in the northeast and northcentral
United States had a negative shift-share for the period 1950-1990.
This means that the cities' loss in manufacturing jobs was not at-
tributable solely to national trends.
2. Urban Decrease in Manufacturing vs. Suburban Decrease in
Manufacturing
As stated above, Brownfields Programs do not balance cities
against the nation: they balance cities against suburbs. The obvi-
45. HARVEY S. PERLOFF ET AL., REGIONS, RESOURCES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1960).
46. Benjamin L. Stevens & Craig L. Moore, A Critical Review of the Literature on
Shift-Share as a Forecasting Technique, 20 J. OF REGIONAL SCi. 419 (1980).
47. See id.
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Table 1
Shift Share Manufacturing 1950-1990 City vs. Suburb
City City Shift Share Suburb Suburb Shift Share
City 1950 1990 of City 1950 1990 of Suburb
Philadelphia, PA 32.91% 12.26% -9.826470 36.95% 17.23% -7.561611
Pittsburgh, PA 26.34% 7.72% -9.960301 40.24% 14.65% -12.352688
Chicago, IL 35.01% 16.55% -6.942408 37.96% 18.08% -7.394107
Baltimore, MD 27.36% 11.14% -7.220292 31.23% 11.97% -8.987360
New York, NY 26.07% 10.39% -7.103870 22.08% 11.76% -3.059223
Cincinnati, OH 29.79% 14.16% -5.830440 33.82% 20.04% -2.659036
Cleveland, OH 40.07% 19.88% -7.009863 36.48% 20.72% -3.755478
Toledo, OH 35.77% 17.63% -6.373339 38.21% 20.60% -5.036612
Detroit, MI 42.72% 16.47% -12.193145 46.66% 24.94% -6.368844
Boston, MA 21.96% 9.08% -5.653266 29.75% 14.74% -5.221627
Milwaukee, WI 41.18% 20.26% -7.373659 43.28% 24.49% -4.550291
St. Louis, MO 32.45% 13.45% -8.320078 32.55% 18.50% -3.342100
Kansas City, MO 21.44% 12.71% -1.676399 25.78% 14.87% -2.431014
Indianapolis, IN 31.25% 14.99% -5.975826 34.05% 19.37% -3.479059
Newark, NJ 35.63% 17.58% -6.323736 38.39% 16.35% -9.411964
Buffalo, NY 34.86% 14.30% -9.084511 42.32% 16.86% -11.532590
Minneapolis, MN 23.30% 13.18% -2.45427237 25.42% 19.62% 2.55688341
Source of Raw Data: 1950 and 1990 Census of the Population, U.S. Dept. of Commerce:
General Social and Economic Characteristics
ous question, then, is whether northeast and northcentral suburban
areas likewise suffered the effects of deindustrialization dispropor-
tionately vis-d-vis the nation.
The shift-share formula was modified to calculate suburban shift-
share:
I = io . (gO,t -g0),
where
i°  - the employment share of Sector i in the labor force of the
suburb at year 0;
6N - the growth index of the employment share of Sector i in
the labor force of the suburb between year 0 and t;
(Suburban labor force is SMSA 48 labor force minus central city
labor force.)
Like their respective cities, suburbs of the northeast and
northcentral United States have fared poorly as compared with the
rest of the nation.49 As shown in Table 1, suburbs suffered the
same disproportionate decline as did their central cities.50
48. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
49. With the exception of Minneapolis suburbs.
50. In some cases the suburbs suffered a steeper decline than their respective cities
(e.g. Pittsburgh).
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From this data we can infer conclusion number 1: cities and sub-
urbs in the northeast and northcentral United States both suffered
the effects of the shift away from manufacturing employment. In
essence, cities and suburbs are complements, not substitutes. The
application of this conclusion to the policy driving the Brownfields
Programs is therefore troublesome. If cities and suburbs both suf-
fer the effects of deindustrialization, why modify environmental
standards only as they apply to the cities? What is the policy goal
that allows for different treatment of the suburbs in the same
situation?
B. Other Employment Sectors in the Northeast and
Northcentral United States
Perhaps the answer to the above question lies in the second
prong of the post-industrial thesis. The thesis contends that not
only will there be a shift away from manufacturing in a maturing
economy (deindustrialization) but that manufacturing job loss will
be picked up by other employment sectors.5 1 The impact of
deindustrialization is therefore a function of the difference be-
tween the rate of deindustrialization and the rate of growth in the
service and other sectors.52 In other words, was the loss of manu-'
facturing jobs compensated, for by an increase in opportunities in
the service sector and other employment sectors in both cities and
suburbs?
To answer this question, shift-share calculations were performed
on the city and suburban labor forces for the following employ-
ment sectors: service;53 financial, insurance, and real estate
("FIRE"); agriculture, forestry and fisheries; mining, construction,
transportation and communications; public utilities; wholesale and
retail trade; and public administration.5 4 The formulas used were
updated to reflect the different employment categories.
As shown in Table 2, cities generally had a positive shift-share in
services, a negative shift-share in FIRE, and mixed results in those
sectors falling under the heading of Other.
51. Yago, supra note 30, at 29. See also BELL, iupra note 28.
52. Rodwin, supra note 28, at 13..
53. "Service" consists of four major categories: business and repair services, per-
sonal services, entertainment and recreation services, and professional and related
services.
54. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Mining, Construction, Transportation,
Communications and other Public Utilities, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Public
Administration are hereinafter aggregated under the heading "Other."
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Table 2
Shift Share 1950-1990 All Employment Sectors (City)
Mfg Shift Serv Shift FIRE Shift Other Shift Total Shift
City Share Share Share Share Share
Philadelphia, PA -9.826470 4.181042 -0.694769 4.312937 -2.027261
Pittsburgh, PA -9.960301 7.661873 -1.082979 -0.642068 -4.023476
Chicago, IL -6.942408 2.123357 -1.196311 1.668985 -4.346376
Baltimore, MD -7.220292 1.056015 -1.492449 3.192734 -4.463992
New York, NY -7.103870 1.999031 -2.524435 0.119513 -7.509761
Cincinnati, OH -5.830440 -0.263699 -1.757721 ,. 3.042801 -4.809059
Cleveland, OH -7.009863 0.985054 -0.971341 3.839634 -3.156516
Toledo, OH -6.373339 4.462721 -1.094773 4.175403 1.170013
Detroit, MI -12.193145 2.950708 -1.653065 4.379790 -6.515712
Boston, MA -5.653266 5.652678 -0.718476 -5.200410 -5.919474
Milwaukee, WI -7.373659 4.097337 -0.542647 3.454243 -0.364726
St. Louis, MO -8.320078 3.140434 -2.424426 2.414565 -5.189506
Kansas City, MO -1.676399 -2.057442 -3.962700 0.088051 -7.608489
Indianapolis, IN -5.975826 -1.495264 -1.756485 6.568106 -2.659469
Newark, NJ -6.323736 -0.258129 -3.796448 5.855497 -4.522816
Buffalo, NY -9.084511 6.543386 0.086732 1.227615 -1.226778
Minneapolis, MN -2.454272 2.641133 -4.294794 -4.031666 -8.139599
Source of Raw Data: 1950 and 1990 Census of the Population, U.S. Dept. of Commerce:
General Social and Economic Characteristics
In the suburbs of these cities, the same general pattern follows:
an increase relative to the nation in services, a decrease (or mini-
mal increase) in FIRE, and an increase in the Other sectors (see
Table 3). If, however, the shift-shares for all employment sectors
are summed, evidence that there has been a different impact on
cities than on suburbs begins to emerge. Comparing the total shift
columns ofTables 2 and 3, it is apparent that while suburban loss in
manufacturing 55 was offset by increases in other sectors, urban loss
in manufacturing was not.5 6 Thus, for the suburbs, the post-indus-
trial thesis holds true-losses in manufacturing have been offset by
gains in other sectors. In the cities, however, the theory has not
been borne out.
These results lead to conclusion number two: there is a difference
in the shifts to employment sectors other than manufacturing be-
tween northeast and northcentral cities and their respective suburbs.
C. Decomposition of Manufacturing Job Loss
Because cities in the northeast and northcentral United States
have behaved differently from their respective suburbs with regard
to employment shifts to other sectors, the next question is: where
55. Except New York, Minneapolis and Cleveland suburbs.
56. Except in Toledo.
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Table 3
Shift Share 1950-1990 All Employment
Sectors (Suburb)
Mfg Shift Serv Shift FIRE Shift Other Shift Total Shift
City-SUBURB Share Share Share Share Share
Philadelphia, PA -7.561611 2.974382 -0.300569 7.758069 2.870272
Pittsburgh, PA -12.352688 9.181069 1.390078 9.233587 7.452045
Chicago, IL -7.394107 0.653020 1.349385 7.758864 2.367162
Baltimore, MD -8.987360 1.343070 0.506981 9.764261 2.626952
New York, NY -3.059223 -4.859148 -2.777726 0.495345 -10.200752
Cincinnati, OH -2.659036 1.686467 -1.604619 5.828743 3.251555
Cleveland, OH -3.755478 -0.324148 -2.073420 5.188439 -0.964607
Toledo, OH -5.036612 10.719423 0.263149 2.775342 8.721302
Detroit, MI -6.368844 5.088089 0.884582 9.680339 9.284166
Boston, MA -5.221627 0.916206 -2.409736 7.102436 0.387278
Milwaukee, WI -4.550291 3.155577 -0.147123 6.478044 4.936206
St. Louis, MO -3.342100 2.700520 -0.597385 3.191740 1.952776
Kansas City, MO -2.431014 1.819958 0.502939 1.053967 0.945850
Indianapolis, IN -3.479059 2.579868 -0.167195 5.075756 4.009371
Newark, NJ -9.411964 4.121693 -0.938109 7.893555 1.665176
Buffalo, NY -11.532590 7.329774 1.472399 9.784916 7.054498
Minneapolis, MN 2.556883 -1.960357 -1.495685 -1.163724 -2.062883
Source of Raw Data: 1950 and 1990 Census of the Population,
General Social and Economic Characteristics
U.S. Dept. of Commerce:
did these workers go? If the former manufacturing workers were
not absorbed into the labor force by other employment sectors, did
they join the ranks of the unemployed? The imperfect shift may be
explained by the fact that shift-share analysis does not account for
those unemployed workers because it is concerned only with the
growth in different employment sectors.57
The loss in the manufacturing sector is decomposed according to
the following formula:
57. Except for Indianapolis and Toledo, both of which grew dramatically in square
miles, all of the studied cities lost absolute population between 1950 and 1990. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1953 (1994). We need to approxi-
mate how many of those people leaving the city had lost their urban manufacturing
jobs before we approximate the shift to unemployment. We therefore need to esti-
mate the "migration impact." To accomplish this I first estimated the migration from
a city each year and ran a regression of the population on the age structure for each
city. This regression line estimates the remaining labor force after migration each
year. I then integrated the remaining labor force from 1951 to 1990. This integration
is the migration impact on the labor force in 1990.
1996] BROWNFIELDS INITIATIVES
MD = MP +MU + MM,
where,
MD - total number who lost jobs in the manufacturing sector of a
city between 1950 and 1990;
MP - MD employment which is absorbed by other employment
sectors in the city;
MU - MD employment that is not absorbed into other employment
sectors that became unemployed;
MM - MD that moved out of the city.
I assumed that those who lost jobs in the manufacturing sector suf-
fered at least the average unemployment rate of the city in 1990.
Please refer to the Appendix for an explanation of this formula's
components.
Table 4
Decomposition of Manufacturing Job Loss 1950-1990
(Average Unemployment Rate 1990)
Mfg Jobs
Absorbed
by All % Absorbed
Other Mfg Jobs Mfg Jobs by All % Absorbed
Mfg Job Emp. Absorbed by to Other by % to
City Loss Sectors Unemployment Emigration Sectors Unemployment Emigration
Philadelphia, PA 202172 80853 48248 73071 39.99% 23.86% 36.14%
Pittsburgh, PA 60413 8779 7471 44163 14.53% 12.37% 73.10%
Chicago, IL 367881 112451 96791 158639 30.57% 26.31% 43.12%
Baltimore, MD 74827 28983 19081 26763 38.73% 25.50% 35.77%
New York, NY 544605 495599 49006 0 91.00% 9.00% 0.00%
Cincinnati, OH 39293 13137 8272 17885 33.43% 21.05% 45.52%
Cleveland, OH 123311 0 17620 105691 0.00% 14.29% 85.71%
Toledo, OH 20058 18065 1993 0 90.06% 9.94% 0.00%
Detroit, MI 280023 1524 55183 223316 0.54% 19.71% 79.75%
Boston, MA 45223 34775 10448 0 76.90% 23.10% 0.00%
Milwaukee, WI 59117 51111 8006 0 86.46% 13.54% 0.00%
St. Louis, MO 100020 0 10963 89057 0.00% 10.96% 89.04%
Kansas City, MO 16164 14992 1172 0 92.75% 7.25% 0.00%
Indianapolis, IN 2108 1989 119 0 94.35% 5.65% 0.00%
Newark, NJ 49464 1831 11127 36506 3.70% 22.49% 73.80%
Buffalo, NY 65589 7875 9796 47918 12.01% 14.94% 73.06%
Minneapolis, MN 29028 13485 5529 10014 46.45% 19.05% 34.50%
Source of Raw Data: 1950 and 1990 Census of the Population, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: General Social and
Economic Characteristics
The results of the decomposition of manufacturing job loss are
shown in Table 4. In some cities, 1 in 4 workers went from manu-
facturing job loss to unemployment. If we use the minority unem-
ployment rate instead of the aggregate unemployment rate the
result is more stark. See Table 5.
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Table 5
Decomposition of Manufacturing Job Loss 1950-1990
(Minority Unemployment .Rate 1990)
Mfg Jobs
Absorbed
by All % Absorbed
Other Mfg Jobs Mfg Jobs by All % Absorbed
Mfg Job Emp. Absorbed by to Other by . % to
City Loss Sectors Unemployment Emigration Sectors Unemployment Emigration
Philadelphia, PA .202172 -80853 48248 73071 39.99% 23.86% 36.14%
Pittsburgh, PA 60413 8779 7471 44163 14.53% 18.90% 66.57%
Chicago, IL 367881 112451 96791 158639 30.57% 26.31% 43.12%
Baltimore, MD 74827 28983 19081 26763 38.73% 25.50% 35.77%
New York, NY 544605 495599 49006 0 87.10% 12.90% 0.00%
Cincinnati, OH 39293 13137 8272 17885 33.43%, 21.05% 45:52%
Cleveland, OH 123311 0 17620 105691 0.00% 20.50% 79.50%
Toledo, OH 20058 18065 1993 0 79.50% 20.50% 0.00%
Detroit,,MI 280023 1524 55183 223316 0.54% 22.20% 77.26%
Boston, MA 45223 34775 10448 0 76.90% 23.10% 0.00%
Milwaukee, WI 59117 51111 8006 0 81.40% 18.60% 0.00%
St. Louis, MO 100020 0 10963 89057 0.00% 18.10% 81.90%
Kansas City, MO 16164 14992 1172 0 86.20% 13.80% 0.00%
Indianapolis, IN 2108 1989 119 0 87.90% 12.10% 0.00%
Newark, NJ 49464 1831 11127 36506 3.70% 22.49% 73.80%
Buffalo, NY 65589 7875 9796 47918 12.01% 18.80% 69.19%
Minneapolis, MN 29028 13485 5529 10014 46.45% 19.05% 34.50%
Source of Raw Data: 1950 and 1990 Census of the Population, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: General Social and
Economic Characteristics
This leads to conclusion number three: In a city-by-city analysis,
there is evidence that loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector leads
to central city unemployment even after factoring in the migration
impact. Therefore, although northeast and northcentral cities and
their suburbs both suffered the effects of deindustrialization more:
harshly than the rest of the nation, the suburbs picked up the dif-
ference by expanding other employment sectors while the cities did
not. In most cities, workers moved away from manufacturing em-
ployment to unemployment in decisive numbers.
III. Legitimacy of Brownfields Programs
Disparate environmental treatment of the suburbs and the cities
may be justified based on the disparate impact of the effects of
deindustrialization on these areas. 58 This economic incentive is fur-
ther bolstered by the strong positive correlation between the de-
58. The economic goal of the programs may be acceptable to some based on a
simple comparison of city versus suburban unemployment regardless of the underly-
ing causes. This approach, though, uncouples the economic goal from the environ-
mental goal of the programs. The recasting of environmental standards becomes the
means to an economic end - not an end in and unto itself. Without the environmental
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gree of industrialization and multiplier effects in other employment
sectors.59
The environmental aspect of the Brownfields Programs is not,
however, so easily justified. Although the Brownfields Programs
may solve present day employment problems, they also may create
future environmental catastrophes. The programs allow cities and
suburbs to move along different environmental trajectories. While
preserved suburban land will remain uncontaminated in the future,
city land will be perpetually polluted. Like the cancer patient opt-
ing for intermediary relief that forecloses the long- term cure, cities
may be losing more than they gain.
City leaders should ask themselves the same preliminary ques-
tion as our cancer patient: does this drug alleviate the symptoms of
my cancer? Given the mathematical conclusions reached earlier in
this comment, it appears that the quick answer to the above ques-
tion is "yes." One of the underlying assumptions of the
Brownfields Programs is that the cities' cancer grows from the shift
in the American economy away from manufacturing employment.
In other words, the regional duality in environmental standards
may be justified by disparate recoveries from the effect of
deindustrialization.
But before jumping at the opportunity to create employment,
city leaders should ask the next question: will this measure prevent
an ultimate cure? In other words, are cities preventing the possi-
bility of economic parity with the suburbs by consigning themselves
to second-class environmental status? Leaving aside moral argu-
ments,60 the long-term economic implication of environmental dis-
parity assigns "clean" jobs to the suburbs and "dirty" jobs to the
city in a downward spiral.
In a somewhat anomalous position, city leaders resist extending
brownfield-like environmental standards to all properties: city and
suburb.61 Fearing that all the money, and jobs, would migrate to
the suburbs, city leaders want to keep this environmental exception
goal of green space preservation, the disparate environmental treatment of city prop-
erty is an even more stark tradeoff.
59. Se-Hark Park, Linkages Between Industry and Services and Their Implication
for Urban Employment Generation in Developing Countries, 30 J. oF DEv. EcoN. 359
(April 1989).
60. Such as, for example, environmental justice. For a discussion of this topic, see
Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment,
15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37 (1995); Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist
Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 23 (1996).
61. Rich Henson, City Sees Loopholes in Ridge Plan for Polluted Sites, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 30, 1995, at B1. (Deputy Mayor of Philadelphia Mark Gaige
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to themselves. I submit that this position is short-sighted. The ef-
fects of this policy direction will be felt long after the current may-
ors leave office. For the long-term viability of central cities, leaders
should demand an even application of environmental standards
that addresses the brownfields problems but does not create envi-
ronmental apartheid. This situation calls for an honest and frank
dialogue to establish workable environmental standards applied to
both city and suburbs.
Of course, such a dialogue would require a reconsideration of
the very foundation of the goals of the environmental laws.
Thiough their application, CERCLA and the state environmental
laws have lost sight of the long range goals of environmental pro-
tection by breaking up protection into incremental policies that,
not suprisingly, have begun to conflict with one another. That in-
cremental and piecemeal approach has contributed to the very
existence of brownfields today.62
This foundational reconsideration may tear at the very heart of
regulatory theory.63 But it need not. We can simply reexamine the
standards of the present regulatory system with a new and critical
eye and ask whether the standards as an entire regime-not as an
individual program or regulation-are effectuating the goals of en-
vironmental protection. For example, we can explore "reflexive"
environmental standards that go beyond traditional governmental
mandates or market driven limitations. Reflexive environmental
law would require a process-oriented restructuring of environmen-
tal standards.64
Our cancer patient should not settle for the temporary allevia-
tion of her symptoms. Despite the pain, she must hold to the hope
that one day the cure will be within her grasp.
commented, "If the law applies to every site, then where is the incentive to reuse
brownfields?").
62. For a discussion of this topic, see J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm
for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 883 (1996).
63. Such as acknowledging the complexity of the societal environment and avoid-
ing the reductionist theory that underpins environmental law today. See id.
64. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1264
(1995) ("Rather than detailed pronouncements of acceptable behavior, the law adopts
procedures for regulated entities to follow. The procedures are adopted with a design
in mind to encourage thinking and behavior in the right direction.").
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Appendix
The components of the formula on page 17, supra, were esti-
mated using the following boundaries:
For MP:
If the job creation in other sectors between 1950 and 1990 (JOBS)
is 0, then MP=0:
If JOBS=0, then MP=0.
If MD (excluding the unemployment rate in the city in 1990 (r.)) is
greater than the number of manufacturing jobs absorbed by JOBS
(assuming that JOBS absorbed the job losses in all the sectors pro-
portionally) (SHARE), then absorption into other sectors is in pro-
portion to manufacturing's share in total employment:
If MD(1-ru) > SHARE, then MP=SHARE.
If MD (excluding the unemployment rate in the city in 1990) is less
than or equal to the number of manufacturing jobs absorbed by
JOBS (assuming that JOBS absorbed the job losses in all the sec-
tors proportionally), then absorption into other sectors is MD (ex-
cluding the unemployment rate in the city in 1990):
If MD(1-r.) ___ SHARE, then MP=MD(1-r.,).
For MU:
If, estimated with manufacturing's share in total employment, un-
employment in manufacturing (UM) is less than unemployment in
those who lost jobs in manufacturing (estimated with the unem-
ployment rate in the city in 1990), then MU is the same as the city's
unemployment rate:
If UM < MD(ru), then MU=MD(ru).
If, estimated with manufacturing's share in total employment, un-
employment in manufacturing is greater than or equal to unem-
ployment in those who lost jobs in manufacturing (estimated with
the unemployment rate in the city in 1990), and estimated unem-
ployment in manufacturing is less than MD minus MP, then MU
equals unemployment in manufacturing:
If UM > MD(ru) and UM < MD-MP, then MU=UM.
If, estimated with manufacturing's share in total employment, un-
employment in manufacturing is greater than or equal to unem-
ployment in those who lost jobs in manufacturing (estimated with
the unemployment rate in the city in 1990) and estimated unem-
ployment in manufacturing is greater than or equal to MD minus
MP, then MU equals MD-MP:
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If UM >_ MD(r,) and UM > MD-MP, then MU=MD-MP.
For MM:
If MD-MP-MU > 0, then MM=MD-MP-MU.
If MD-MP-MU < 0, then MM=O.
